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BIANNUAL SURVEY
commenced within six years after the accrual of the cause of action,
the defense of the statute of limitations was an effective bar.
The holding in the instant case recognizes that service upon
one partner is effective only as against the partner personally served
and the jointly held partnership property. In order to hold an
individual partner personally liable, service must be made on him.
Since the defendant here had not been personally served in the first
action, the judgment entered therein could only affect the value of
his partnership interest, not his personal assets. The twenty-year
period of limitations applicable to a money judgment 30 was not
discussed, apparently because the court felt that it did not apply, no
personal judgment against the individual defendant having been
obtained.
ARTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION AND SnRvcE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT
CPLR 302 being liberally construed to expand jurisdictional
bases in actions against non-domiciliaries.
Section 30131 of the CPLR has retained the bases of jurisdic-
tion which existed under the CPA and former case law. By the
enactment of the "longarm" statute, section 302,'3 the legislature has
greatly broadened the state's bases of in personam jurisdiction.
Before the enactment of section 302(a) (1), a foreign corpora-
tion could not be considered "present" for jurisdictional purposes
unless it had systematic and regular contacts with New York, i.e.,
the corporation had to be doing business here.3 3 As Judge Cardozo
stated: "if it is here, not occasionally or casually, but with a fair
measure of permanence and continuity, then . . . it is within the
jurisdiction of our courts. '3 4
In 1945, the Supreme Court of the United States relaxed the
former demands of due process and went beyond the "presence"
test, holding that due process requires only that the defendant have
so CPLR 211(b).
31 CPLR 301. A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, prop-
erty, or status as might have been exercised heretofore.
32 CPLR 302(a): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section . . . if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state . . . or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state."
33 See, e.g., Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874,
176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958); Elish v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 305 N.Y. 267,
112 N.E.2d 842 (1953) ; Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distrib.
Co., 299 N.Y. 208, 86 N.E.2d 564 (1949).
34 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E. 915, 917
(1917).
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certain "minimum contacts" with the state.3 5 But it required stat-
utes to take advantage of that holding, and New York did not
immediately enact such statutes. Thus, until 1963, the state's bases
for in personam jurisdiction rested on grounds narrower than those
permitted by the Constitution. To broaden the scope of the state's
jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries, section 302 was enacted.38
Prior to the effective date of the CPLR, it was not certain
whether CPLR 302 would carry jurisdiction over non-residents to
the full length permitted by due process.37 The bulk of cases,
however, indicate that section 302 is being liberally construed and
extended toward, if not to, the constitutional limit.38
Section 302(a) (1)- The "Transaction of Business."
It should be remembered at the outset that when a foreign
corporation is doing business in New York, it may be sued on any
cause of action, regardless of whether the cause of action arose
from the New York business.39 One who does business is deemed
"present" and thereby impliedly consents to be sued. A non-resident
who merely "transacts" business, however, is not "present" and can
be held in personam only on a cause of action arising out of that
transaction of business. The 302(a) (1) criterion requires consid-
erably less for "a transaction" of business than prior law's presence
doctrine requires for "the doing" of business. In the recent case
of Brunette Sunapee Corp. v. Zeolux Corp.,40 the court dismissed
an action for breach of warranty and negligence against an Illinois
defendant, since none of the elements of plaintiff's cause of action
arose out of the transaction of business in New York. Plaintiff
contended that Norge Sales, a wholly owned subsidiary of the
defendant corporation, was transacting business in New York; that
Norge and defendant were one and the same and, therefore, that
defendant was within section 302. Assuming the truth of this
allegation, the court held that since the products were manufactured
in Illinois by defendant, purchased in Massachusetts from a Massa-
chusetts corporation, and thereafter installed in New Hampshire
where they failed to operate, there was no transaction of business in
New York from which the cause of action arose.41  Section 302
3- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
36 See 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13, SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COmmiTTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 39.
3 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ff302.01
(1963).
38 See cases discussed infra. See also Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, 41
Misc. 2d 186, 245 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct 1963); Steele v. DeLeeuw, 40 Misc.
2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct 1963).39 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., supra note 34, at 268-69, 115 N.E. at 918.
40228 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
41 Id. at 806.
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